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AUTONOMY AND THE LEGAL CONTROL OF
SELF-REGARDING CONDUCT*
William C. Powers, Jr.**
In his essay On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argues that'
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number,
is [that of] self-protection. .

.

.[T] he only purpose for which power

can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so,
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others,
to do so would be wise, or even right.
Thus, Mill articulates a limit on the legitimate scope of law: "purely
self-regarding conduct1 2 1 cannot properly be meddled with in the way
* This article is a substantial revision of an earlier essay entitled "Tolerance and the
Communal Aspects of Autonomy" which was presented to and funded by the Institute
for Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, Hastings-on-Hudson, New York. It is intended
as a presentation of the author's personal legal philosophy on certain arguments for a
laissez-faire legal structure coupled with suggested alternative bases for protecting individual liberty.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., 1967, University of California (Berkeley); J.D., 1973, Harvard Law School.

1.

J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Crofts ed. 1947).

2. Self-regarding conduct may be loosely defined as conduct which affects only the
actor or persons who freely consent to be affected. Mill uses drunkenness and idleness
as examples of self-regarding conduct that should be beyond the legitimate scope of
legal control. Id. at 82. A more extensive list of the types of laws to which Mill may be
referring has been prepared by Gerald Dworkin within the framework of a discussion of
paternalism. It is helpful in at least intuitively explicating the notion of self-regarding
conduct:
1. Laws requiring motorcyclists to wear safety helmets when operating their machines.
2. Laws forbidding persons from swimming at a public beach when lifeguards are
not on duty.
3. Laws making suicide a criminal offense.
4. Laws making it illegal for women and children to work at certain types ofjobs.
5. Laws regulating certain kinds of sexual conduct, e.g., homosexuality among
consenting adults in private.
6. Laws regulating the use of certain drugs which may have harmful consequences
to the user but do not lead to anti-social conduct.
7. Laws requiring a license to engage in certain professions with those not receiving a license subject to fine or jail sentence if they do engage in the practice.
8. Laws compelling people to spend a specified fraction of their income on the
purchase of retirement annuities (Social Security).
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of prevention or punishment."' 3 Accordingly, except where an individual's conduct harms others, his individually chosen attitude and lifestyle must be tolerated by the community rather than frustrated by
either limiting the scope of his choices or directly imposing communally determined attitudes and lifestyles on him.
My purpose in this essay is to criticize Mill's principle of liberty as
a limit on the legitimate scope of legal coercion. I shall do so not by
focusing on previously examined justifications for frustrating individually chosen lifestyles, 4 but rather by examining the arguments in favor
9. Laws forbidding various forms of gambling (often justified on the grounds
that the poor are more likely to throw away their money on such activities
than the rich who can afford to).
10. Laws regulating the maximum rates of interest for loans.
11. Laws against duelling.
In addition to laws which attach criminal or civil penalties to certain kinds of
action there are laws, rules, regulations, decrees which make it either difficult or
impossible for people to carry out their plans and which are also justified on paternalistic grounds. Examples of this are:
1. Laws regulating the types of contracts which will be upheld as valid by the
courts, e.g. . . . no man may make a valid contract for perpetual involuntary
servitude.
2. Not allowing assumption of risk as a defense to an action based on the
violation of a safety statute.
3. Not allowing as a defense to a charge of murder or assault the consent of
the victim.
4. Requiring members of certain religious sects to have compulsory blood
transfusions. This is made possible by not allowing the patient to have recourse to civil suits for assault and battery and by means of injunctions.
5. Civil commitment procedures when these are specifically justified on the
basis of preventing the person being committed from harming himself....
G. Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107, 108-09 (R. Wasserstrom
ed. 1971).
The term "victimless crime" is often used rather than "a crime involving self-regarding conduct." See E. SCHUR & H. BEDAU, VICTIMLESS CRIMES: Two SIDES OF A
CONTROVERSY (1974). A rigorous definition of "self-regarding conduct" or "victimless
crime" will not be attempted since the thesis presented here is that the conduct to
which Mill intends to refer is not, in fact, truly self-regarding.
3. MILL, supra note 1, at 99.
4. An extensive body of literature has been generated concerning the propriety of
legal coercion to affect self-regarding conduct. For example, the Wolfenden report,
published in England in 1957, recommending that homosexual practices between consenting adults be decriminalized, echoes Mill's principle of liberty by asserting that
"there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is. in brief and
crude terms, not the law's business." REPORT OF THE COMMITrE ON HOMOSEXUAL
OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION (The Wolfenden Report), CMD. No. 247, at 24 (1957).

The debate which has followed the publication of the Wolfenden report has focused
on alleged justifications for communal interference with individually determined
attitudes and lifestyles rather than on the value of individual autonomy and free
choice. For example, Lord Devlin and H.L.A. Hart have debated, under the rubric
of the "enforcement of morals," whether communally determined lifestyles may be
imposed upon unwilling individuals in order to satisfy a common community morality. See P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); H.L.A. HART, LAW,
LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1962); H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason in MORALITY AND
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of the principle of liberty itself. I shall argue that at least two of its

principal bases do not support its conclusion that communally determined elements of lifestyle cannot be legitimately imposed on unwilling individuals except to prevent harm to others. 5 Indeed, these

bases are fully consistent with the imposition of communally rather
than individually determined lifestyles and attitudes.
I.
A.

TWO BASES OF MILL'S PRINCIPLE OF LIBERTY
"Goodness" Defined By Individual Choice

Two major lines of argument, both discernible in Mill's work, can
be advanced to support the value of tolerance embodied in his principle of liberty. 6 First, pure tolerance of individually chosen, self-reTHE LAW (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971); H.L.A. Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morals, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1967). See also R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND
REASON 157-85 (1963); R. Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals,
75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966); Hughes, Morals and the Criminal Law, 71 YALE L.J. 662
(1962); Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAMB. LJ. 174; Sartorius, The
Enforcement of Morality, 81 YALE LJ. 891 (1972); Comment, Private Consensual
Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm To Othersin the Enforcement of Morality,
14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 581 (1967). On the other hand, the discussion under the rubric
of "paternalism" asks whether the law may legitimately limit individual choice and
autonomy for the benefit of the person whose choice is frustrated. See, e.g., G. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 107; American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Daniels, I MICH. App. 351,
158 N.W.2d 72 (1968) (statutory amendment requiring motorcyclists and riders to
wear crash helmets held unconstitutional because it had no relationship to the public
health, safety, morals, or the general welfare). Some authors have objected to one
justification without condemning the other. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART,LAW, LIBERTY AND
MORALITY 30 (1962).
Moreover, supporters of decriminalization of "victimless crimes"-i.e., crimes
involving self-regarding conduct-have drawn upon interests, such as the social and
economic costs of enforcement, that do not arise directly from an argument for individual choice and autonomy. See, e.g., E. SCHUR & H. BEDAU, supra note 2, at 11-37.
But the underlying assumption which runs through most of the debate, whether it focuses on "paternalism" or the "enforcement of morality," is that individuals have at
least a prima facie right to choose their own way of life so long as they do not directly
harm other people.
5. Thus, my argument will assume, arguendo, the underlying tenets of Mill's
libertarian view. My criticism is "partial" since it challenges Mill's conclusion within
the perimeter of his own thought. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 1-28
(1975). The result may simply be an expansion of the meaning of "harm to others"
beyond that which Mill envisioned, leaving the principle of liberty itself intact. So be
it. My purpose is to challenge Mill's principle as it is commonly used, i.e., direct
physical or economic impact. I simply choose to use "harm to others" with the meaning I believe Mill had in mind and attack his principle rather than accept the principle
and attack his notion of "harm to others."
6. A third argument, which may be referred to as formalism, is also discernible in
Mill. See MILL, supra note 1, at 15-54. Discussion of it is deferred until later in the
essay. See text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 51: 33, 1975

garding life styles and attitudes may be supported by an underlying
conception of value that is itself tied to individual choice. In his formulation of utilitarianism, Mill defines value as human happiness,
with the relative happiness created by two competing courses of conduct being determined by "the preference felt by those who in their
opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of selfconsciousness and self-observation, are best furnished with the means
of comparison."'7 Thus, the "goodness" of a lifestyle or attitude is
judged against this choice criterion of value. If value is dependent
solely on human choice, there is no independent value against which
human choices can be criticized. Attitudes and lifestyles which are
actually chosen by individuals are the very ones that are defined as
"good" and that create "happiness" under Mill's principle of utility. 8
Such a solipsistic conception of value does not itself provide a proscription against intolerance, but it makes difficult an attempt affirmatively to justify intolerance in the name of a value that transcends 9 the
individual whose behavior or attitudes are not tolerated. A solipsistic
conception of value does not argue positively in favor of tolerating
individually chosen, self-regarding activities, but it does frustrate attempts to override individual choice for the sake of "correctly" chosen
conduct. 0
7. J.S. MILL, Utilitarianism, inTHE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 189,
199 (Bantam ed. 1961). See also R.M. HARE, supra note 4, at 157-85.
8. Some commentators have argued that Mill's formulation of utilitarianism is
inconsistent with his principle of liberty. See I. BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY
13 (1958). If utilitarianism defines "value" as human happiness, which in turn is
defined as a biological state at least theoretically measurable in an objective way.
there is no reason to believe that such a state will be achieved through adherence
to Mill's principle of liberty. Mill's formulation of utilitarianism does not, however,
define value with reference to a biological state. Rather, it defines value with reference to human choice. It is true that Mill's choice criterion of value is dependent
upon the choices that would be made by persons who "are best furnished with the
means of comparison" rather than actual choices made by real individuals. J.S. MILL,
Utilitarianism, in THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 189, 199 (Bantam
ed. 1961). A similar refinement is contained, however, in Mill's principle of liberty
which "is meant to apply to human beings in the maturity of their faculties." MILL.
supra note 1, at 10. It is far from clear that Mill equated persons who "are best
furnished with the means of comparison" with "human beings in the maturity of
their faculties." Thus, the principle of liberty and the principle of utility might not
be precisely coincidental. They do not, however, seem widely divergent, and the
definition of value based upon human choice is supportive of a principle of tolerance. If value is tied to human choices, it is difficult to criticize human choices
and be intolerant of them in the name of value.
9. See note 19 infra.
10. Similar reliance could be placed upon Sartre's conception of value: "I do not
have nor can I have value recourse to any value against the fact that it is I who
sustain values in being." J. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 77 (Wash. Square ed..
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I shall argue that a choice criterion of value" need not require absolute tolerance of individual choices, even when those choices appear
at first glance to be self-regarding. It is true that many attempts to
override individual choices rely on values that transcend human
choice.' 2 However, the value of human choice itself can be used to
support the frustration of individual choices in order that the individual choices of others may be effectuated. Thus, absolute tolerance
of individual choices is not entailed by a choice criterion of value.
B.

Autonomy and Human Dignity

A second major argument, explicitly used by Mill, on which the
principle of liberty might rest, is based upon a "humanistic"' 3 conception of human dignity. This argument ties human dignity to autonomy, i.e., the ability to define and control one's own attitudes and way
of life. By choosing our own plan of life, and thereby defining ourselves as persons, 14 we engage in a uniquely human enterprise that
expresses our dignity as moral beings. Conversely, a lifeplan that originates outside the individual and is imposed upon him by the community is an affront to the individual that robs him of his dignity. Thus,
5
Mill argues that a person'
who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life
for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties.... It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and

H. Barnes transl. 1966). See also J. Sartre, The Flies, in No EXIT AND THREE OTHER
PLAYS 49, 122 (Vintage ed., S. Gilbert transl. 1955); F. NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE
ZARATHUSTRA, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 103, 171 (Viking ed., W. Kaufmann
transl. 1954).
11. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
12. E.g., the enforcement of a theocratic morality. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
13. See P. LONDON, BEHAVIOR CONTROL 190-98 (1969).
14. This notion has its source in several individualistic philosophies. Josiah Royce
asserts that "a person, an individual self, may be defined as a human life lived
according to a plan," and that an individual defines himself as a person by the plan
he adopts. J. ROYCE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY 168 (1908). Royce's point is
developed more fully in J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 407-16 (1971), and C. FRIED,
AN

ANATOMY

OF VALUES:

PROBLEMS

OF PERSONAL

AND

SOCIAL CHOICE

97-101

(1970). A related notion, concentrating on actions rather than values, is Sartre's
development of"being-for-itself" in BEING AND NOTHINGNESS. J. SARTRE, supra note 10.
15. MILL, supra note 1, at 58-59. See also P. LONDON, supra note 13, at 190.
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kept out of harm's way. . . . But what will be his comparative worth
as a human being? . . . Human nature is not a machine to be built
after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a
tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according
to the tendency of inward forces which make it a living thing.

The humanistic argument simply applauds individual autonomy. It
does not equate attitudes and lifestyles that are indeed autonomously
chosen by individuals with "good" attitudes and lifestyles. Rather, the
humanistic argument asserts that the value of choosing is itself lexi17
cally prior 16 to the value of the attitude or lifestyle that is chosen.
16.

I use the term "lexically prior" in the sense that Rawls uses it in A THEORY OF
One value is lexically prior to another when its fulfillment or satisfaction
is a condition precedent to any consideration of the second value. See J. RAWLS,
supra note 14, at 42-43. Autonomy might not be the only value posited by the
humanistic argument, but it must be absolutely satisfied in the sense that there can
be no trade-off between it and lesser values such as privacy and happiness.
17. It is clear that Mill intended this argument to support individually chosen
attitudes and lifestyles-not simply communally chosen lifestyles that are autonomous in the sense that the community is free from external control, either by
another community or a deity. This is evidenced by the fact that the argument
appears in a chapter entitled: "Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of WellBeing." MILL, supra note 1, at 58-59. The humanistic conception of individual
autonomy is also threatened by personality-altering behavior control techniques which
have been the focus of what Eric Fromm has called the three great "negative utopias"
of the middle of the twentieth century: Orwell's 1984, Huxley's BRAVE NEW WORLD,
and Zamyatin's WE. Fromm, Afterword, to G. ORWELL, 1984, at 259 (Signet ed. 1950).
Their common theme is the spectre of a society in which individuality and selfdetermined value are replaced by collectivity and externally imposed lifeplans, values,
and thoughts: where autonomous individuals are "conditioned" and transformed into
externally molded and controlled automatons. The fictional situations are purposely
severe, but the underlying concern is reflected by several commentators who question
the propriety, in a society that purports to value autonomy, of specific behavior
control techniques presently used in penal and mental institutions. For example,
Professor Packer is "impelled to ask whether a theory of punishment that would require acquiescence in compelled personality change can ever be squared with the
JUSTICE.

long-cherished ideals of human autonomy." H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
57-58 (1968). See also H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 136-86 (1968); P. LONDON, supra note 13; Comment, supra note 4. See N.
KiTTRIE. THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971), which accepts the therapeutic imCRIMINAL SANCTION

pact of behavior control, while expressing a concern with individual liberty. This work
might aid the argument that the two views can, to a certain extent, be harmonized.
Behavior control technology is in use at Patuxent Institution for Defective Delinquents, a penal institution in Maryland. See Stanford, A Model, Clockwork-Orange
Prison, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 9; Tippett v. Maryland, 436
F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971) (Maryland Defective Delinquents Act upheld against
constitutional attack on due process grounds); Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th
Cir. 1964) (constitutional challenge of Maryland Defective Delinquents Act remanded for further hearings). But see McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution,
407 U.S. 245 (1972) (holding prisoner after expiration of criminal sentence to
determine whether continued confinement at Patuxent appropriate violates due
process). For a survey of the frequency of the use of behavior control programs in
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I shall argue that autonomy, at least as a political concept,1 8 is best

viewed as inhering at least partially in communities of individuals
rather than in individuals themselves. Thus, autonomy need not proscribe, and indeed supports, the imposition of communally determined
attitudes and lifestyles upon unwilling individuals. Consequently, the

community need not, for the sake of autonomy, absolutely tolerate
individually chosen attitudes and lifestyles regardless of their content,

even when those attitudes or lifestyles do not directly harm other individuals. Although distinctly separate concepts, a choice criterion of
value and the humanistic value of individual autonomy work in harmony to support the concept of tolerance embodied in Mill's principle
of liberty. I now turn my attention to a more detailed analysis of the
question whether these arguments support the equation of human
choice and autonomy with individuality, thereby supporting the re-

quirement that individually chosen lifestyles and attitudes be tolerated
as envisioned by Mill.
II.

THE CHOICE CRITERION OF VALUE

Several situations exist in which individually chosen attitudes and
lifestyles might be frustrated consistent with a criterion of value based
state prisons see Blatte, State Prisons and the Use of Behavior Control, in THE
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, INSTITUTE OF SOCIETY, ETHICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES

4:4 (Sept. 1974).
To be sure, personality altering techniques of behavior control differ significantly
from criminal laws that proscribe private consensual or self-regarding activities.
The latter merely frustrate desire, whereas the former alter desire itself. One might,
therefore, regard behavior control as more destructive of individual autonomy; control over one's attitudes might be more essential to a conception of autonomy than
control over one's lifestyle. But behavior control and "victimless crimes" pose
similar problems for autonomy and tolerance in that each involves an externally
determined conception of a "good" lifestyle or attitude that is imposed on individuals
rather than autonomously chosen by the individuals themselves. Thus, despite
their differences, each faces criticism based upon an argument from autonomy, and
it becomes important to determine whether autonomy, standing alone, actually
supports such an argument.
18. I am not here concerned with autonomy as an ontological concept or the
debate concerning free will. See, e.g., FREE WILL (S. Morgendesser & J. Walsh eds.
1962). Similarly, it is clear that Mill was not concerned with "liberty" as an ontological concept.'See MILL, supra note, 1 at 1 ("The subject of this Essay is not thfe
so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine
of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of
the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual."). Even
if one subscribes to ontological determinism, there is room for debate concerning
the propriety of the state or community purposefully controlling individual conduct.
Neither am I concerned with developing a precise definition of autonomy, although
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upon human choice. These situations, as the following discussion will
indicate, suggest that choice-based utilitarianism, while supportive of
autonomy, does not support a concept of autonomy that is necessarily
tied to absolute individuality. Thus, it does not support a principle
that requires pure tolerance of individually chosen attitudes and lifestyles regardless of their content. Of course, it is not difficult to justify
intolerance of individually chosen lifestyles and attitudes if one is prepared to assert a transcendental 19 value system that is not dependent
upon human choice. The following arguments are significant, however, in that they do not rely upon a transcendental value system.
Rather, they rely on human choice itself as a justification for the frustration of individual choices in specific circumstances.
A.

Prevention of Harm to Others

A primary justification for infringing upon a freely chosen course of
conduct is contained in Mill's principle of liberty itself. The principle
of liberty is not only a proscription against interference with individual free choice, it is also an affirmative justification for such interference whenever it is necessary "for prevention of harm to others." 20
The argument that individual choices can be frust,'ated to prevent
harm to other individuals can be supported by reference to the value
of free choice itself. Activities that harm other individuals decrease the
ability of those individuals to freely choose their own way of life.
Thus, restriction of free choice to prevent harm to others can be
viewed as an enhancement of overall free choice because it protects
the ability of other individuals to choose their own lifeplans.
The concept of "harm" as a justification for limiting individual
choice is a flexible one that can be used to justify greater or lesser dethere is room for much study in this regard. For example, does autonomy specify
a first order condition requiring the absence of determinants or a second order condition requiring approval of first order determinants? See G. Dworkin, Autonomy and
Behavior Control, 1975 (unpublished paper on file at the offices of the Washington Law Review). But for my purposes, a rough notion of autonomy specifying
some form of self-control, approval, or consent will suffice. I am concerned with
the question whether autonomy, whatever its other attributes, is individualistic or
communal.
19. By "transcendental" I mean a value that transcends individuals and their
preferences and beliefs. Thus, one could argue for the "enforcement of morality"
by simply asserting that the morality being enforced represents a higher value than
human choice.
20. G. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 107.
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grees of social control, depending upon the nature of the alleged
harm. For example, aesthetic and moral offenses can cause very real
harm to human happiness. Therefore, at least one author has argued
that "offense," if sufficiently legitimate, should count as "harm" and
therefore be a sufficient justification for the frustration of an individually chosen course of conduct. 2 1 If harm is defined broadly enough to
include the offense one feels toward self-regarding "immoral" behavior, the efficacy of Mill's principle of liberty is greatly undermined.
But the amorphous nature of "harm" does not rob it of its intuitive content as an element in Mill's principle of liberty: at some point an individual's freely chosen conduct does become destructive of the ability
of other individuals to freely choose their own way of life.
Because individually chosen courses of conduct interfere with one
another, free choice is a scarce resource. As such, free choice must be
distributed in an equitable fashion that requires the restriction of one
person's free choice for the sake of another's. 22 A recognition of the
need to infringe upon an individual's free choice to prevent harm to
others does not necessarily weaken the connection between autonomy
and individuality or between autonomy and the objective that individually chosen courses of conduct be tolerated. Certainly, Mill did not
intend such a result by referring to "harm" in his principle of liberty.
As long as "harm" is limited to direct economic or physical detriment,
individually chosen lifestyles and attitudes remain protected.2 3
B.

Enforcement of Anti-Competitive Arrangements

A second justification for restricting individual choice arises from
the interest individuals have in enforcing anti-competitive arrange-

21. Feinberg, "Harmless Immoralities" and Offensive Nuisances, in IssuES IN
LAW AND MORALITY 83-85 (N. Care & T. Trelogan eds. 1973).
22. Thus, Rawls states his principle of liberty as follows: "Each person is to have

an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberty compatible
with a similar system of liberty for all." J. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 250. Similarly,
Kant formulates his principle of justice: "Every action is just [right] that in itself or
in its maxim is such that the freedom of the will of each can coexist together with
the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law." I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTCE 35 (Library of Liberal Arts ed., J. Ladd transl.
1965). See Dyke, Freedom, Consent and the Costs of Interaction, in Is LAw DEAD?
134 (E.Rostow ed. 1971). For a similar point concerning intrapersonal liberty over
time see G. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 107, 118.
23. See note 17 supra.
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ments. 24 Although typical examples occur in the area of economic relationships, this justification for limiting free choice has impact elsewhere as well. A typical example is a group of workers who desire to
restrict their employment to a 40-hour work week. They may be unable to do so unless other workers are proscribed from competing by
offering to work longer hours. Workers who desire to limit their employment to a 40-hour work week cannot obtain their objective
without infringing upon the free choice of other workers concerning
this term of employment. Justification for the infringement of individual free choice in this instance does not depend upon a transcendental conception of value.2 5 Rather, it depends upon the value of satisfying the desire of a group of workers to choose and control one
element of their lifeplan: the terms of their employment.
Similar examples exist outside the economic field in the area of social relationships. For example, individual ice hockey players might
want to wear helmets but might be unable to do so without sacrificing
a competitive edge in terms of mobility. Although players might prefer
the situation in which no one wears a helmet to the one in which every
player wears a helmet, in such an instance their individual free choice
must be frustrated if the choice of other individuals to wear helmets
without suffering a competitive disadvantage is to be honored. Infringing upon the individual free choice of players who desire not to
wear helmets need not be justified by paternalistic references to their
own well-being or by moralistic reference to a transcendental value
that supports wearing helmets. Rather. the frustration of individual
choice can be justified as a necessary prerequisite to satisfying free
choice and desire by other individuals: the choice to wear a hockey
helmet without suffering a competitive disadvantage.
The significance of these examples is that they require a determination of a "good" state of affairs which must be chosen or rejected by
the entire community and not simply by individual members of the
community. In these situations, the ability to choose autonomously
one's own lifestyle cannot be exercised by individuals: rather it must
24. See G. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 107,112.
25. E.g., as a notion that work on the Sabbath is intrinsically evil. See note 19
supra. It is difficult to ascertain the actual motivation behind the desire of certain
individuals to enforce their moral views on other individuals where unrelated to any
obvious competitive forces. The immediate motivation may be an intellectual or emotional desire to satisfy a particular value system by imposing it upon the community.

Self-Regarding Conduct
be exercised by communities of individuals. This results in a necessary
frustration of lifestyles chosen individually by other members of the
26
community.
At least formally, similar arguments might be advanced to justify
the frustration of free individual choice concerning a variety of social
relationships. The enforcement of social institutions such as monogamy, premarital chastity, and customs concerning dress might formally be justified as necessary to enable individuals to choose freely these lifestyles without suffering a competitive social disadvantage.2 7 Formally, imposing these lifestyles on unwilling individuals can
be justified through an argument in favor of anti-competitive arrangements, an argument that does not call upon a transcendental value
system but rather calls upon the desire of a majority of individuals in
the community to choose their own lifestyle without suffering a com28
petitive disadvantage.
C.

Avoidance of Costly Decisions

A third possible justification for infringing upon individual choice
that is based upon autonomy and free choice itself has been developed
by Gerald Dworkin. 29 Situations exist in which an individual might
freely elect to have free choice removed as an available opportunity.3 0
The ability to choose requires making a choice, and the decisionmaking process entails costs.
A decisionmaker must assimilate a variety of information and make

26. Faced with a conflict between the choices of competing groups of individuals, the community might be forced to turn to. a transcendental value to resolve
the difference. For example, it might resolve the dispute between competing groups
of hockey players in favor of those who desire a requirement to wear helmets because the community values safety. But the use of a transcendental value to resolve
conflicting choices is far different from frustrating non-conflicting choices with
reference to the transcendental value directly. In the former situation, the frustration
of one person's individual choice is permitted only when necessary to effectuate the
choice of other individuals. In the latter, individual choice is frustrated solely for
the purpose of satisfying the transcendental value.

27. For example, women who strive for equal pay and non-exploitive social
relationships are hindered significantly by women who "voluntarily" work for less
pay or enter into exploitive social relationships.
28. For a more rigorous discussion of this problem see the discussion of the
prisoner's dilemma in R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-102 (1957).
29. See G. Dworkin, More is Better than Less: The Case of Choice, 1974 (unpublished paper on file at the offices of the Washington Law Review).
30. See note 33 and accompanying text infra.
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calculations based upon that information prior to making a choice. 3 1
Social conventions such as those prescribing certain forms of salutation,
courtesies, and acceptable modes of conduct and dress help lubricate
social intercourse by eliminating the need to spend time and energy
making specific choices in individual circumstances. A simple example
concerns the ease with which military personnel select their wardrobe.
A more interesting cost entailed in free choice is the responsibility
which free choice implies for the decisionmaker. 32 Returning to the
example of the hockey player who is faced with the decision whether
to wear a helmet, the choice to wear a helmet might conflict with a
desire, however unreasonable, to appear courageous. Wearing a
helmet does not detract from that image, but choosing to wear a
helmet might do so. The player might, therefore, desire a rule which
removes the stigma of choice. Similarly, an individual might reasonably prefer a rule that proscribes nude bathing on a public beach so
that he can wear a bathing suit without the stigma of being a prude. 33
As with electing an anti-competitive situation, a free choice to
avoid the costs of choosing by removing the ability to choose cannot
be effectuated individually. A social rule cannot remove the opportunity of free choice in a specific situation from one individual without
3 I. Id.
32. Id.
33. Other examples include a dress code where an individual might desire to
escape the stigma of "slumming" resulting from the choice to wear casual clothes or
the stigma of being stodgy resulting from the choice to wear more formal clothes. A
more serious example concerns euthanasia where a person might desire to live
without the stigma of having made a choice that might bankrupt family or friends.
Similarly, a patient might desire death without the religious stigma of having
committed suicide. An interesting, although possibly disingenuous, example is found
in a case involving a refusal on religious grounds to accept a blood transfusion.
Indicating that the choice to permit a blood transfusion rather than the transfusion
itself was at least a partial basis of the objection, the court ordered a transfusion.
See Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000, 1006-07, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). Judge Wright's commentary makes
the point clearly:
I thereupon proceeded with counsel to the hospital ....
* . * I asked her [the patient] whether she would oppose the blood transfusion
if the court allowed it. She indicated . . . that it would not then be her responsibility.
.
Mrs. Jones had no wish to be a martyr. And her religion merely prevented
her consent to a transfusion. If the law undertook the responsibility of authorizing
the transfusion without her consent, no problem would be raised with respect to
her religious practice. Thus, the effect of the order was to preserve for Mrs. Jones
the life she wanted without sacrifice of her religious beliefs.
331 F.2d at 1006-07, 1009.
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removing it from an entire community of individuals. 34 Thus, hockey
players who desire to play without a helmet and bathers who desire
nudity must have their choice frustrated if we are to honor the choice
of other individuals to have the availability, and thereby the responsibility, of choice removed. The dissenting hockey players and bathers
would not, in these situations, have had their choices frustrated for the
sake of their own good or a transcendental value concerning the
"goodness" of helmets or clothed bathing. Rather, they would have
had their choices frustrated solely for the sake of the autonomy of
other individuals in defining their own lifestyle: a particular course of
conduct without the stigma of having chosen that course of conduct.3 5
D.

Maximizing Choice Satisfaction

A final justification for infringing upon individual choice, which is
consistent with a choice criterion of value and its abhorrence of coer-

cion, is the maximization of choice satisfaction. At first glance maximizing choice satisfaction seems to forbid the frustration of individual
choices based on individual wants. But want or choice satisfaction can
be maximized in either of two ways: by concentrating on the satisfaction of existing wants and choices or by manipulating the wants and
34. Of course, the opportunity to choose might be removed from subsets of the
community rather than from the entire community. Such subsets could not, however,
be determined according to the wishes of individuals in the community. The responsibility inherent in choosing to enter the subset would be similar to the responsibility
inherent in making the ultimate choice itself. See note 39 and accompanying text
infra.
35. Again, the resolution of these conflicting choices might be made with reference to a transcendental value system. See notes 19 & 26 supra.
The importance of this justification for restricting free choice is that it seems particularly applicable to the area of social and sexual morality. The formation of social
and sexual relationships can be especially anxiety-creating and embarrassing. Social
conventions and rules of sexual morality might at least have the effect of facilitating
the creation of social and sexual relationships by removing one of the barriers to
their creation: the anxiety caused by the fear of choosing to do something "wrong."
I wish to emphasize that I am not arguing for re-establishment of social institutions
such as the town matchmaker in order to relieve individuals of the anxiety involved
in choosing a mate. Nor am I arguing in favor of currently enforced social rules
dealing with sexual morality. I oppose such rules, but the import of this analysis is
that opposition to the enforcement of these rules cannot be based solely upon an
argument that refers to autonomy and free choice. Consequently, one might develop
arguments in opposition to the enforcement of rules of sexual morality without
foreclosing the possibility of infringing upon individual free choice in other areas
where it may be desirable to do so, for example, in the area of exploitive, consensual
social relationships. See H. Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in R. WOLFF, B. MOORE
& H. MARCUSE, A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81 (1965).
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choices themselves. Thus, we might maximize the satisfaction of human
choices by structuring the social milieu so that the desires it creates can
be easily satisfied. It would be irrational, as viewed against a standard
of want or choice satisfaction, to continue to satisfy, under a principle
of pure tolerance, certain wants and desires for material goods if the
satisfaction of these wants (or advertising for the goods) simply increases the desires more than it satisfies choices based upon them. Thus,
the frustration of individual wants and free choice in the short term
might be consistent with the long-term maximization of choice satisfaction.
Similarly, a desire to reduce coercion in the long run might be inconsistent with the minimization of coercion in individual instances in
the short run. For example, the freedom to exhibit and view violent
television programs or to advertise certain material goods might create
aggressive or competitive attitudes in individuals. The interference
caused by this aggression or competition might require coercive techniques to minimize the harm caused by some individuals as competition plays itself out. On the other hand, less overall coercion might be
required if in the first place the social milieu were altered so that aggressive and competitive desires were not instilled. Coercion might be
required at the outset to alter the social milieu, but in the long run
individual desires would be less aggressive and conrlictive and there36
fore require less coercion to be regulated.
III.

THE DIGNITY OF CHOOSING ONESELF AS A
PERSON

Just as a choice criterion of value fails to support an individualistic
notion of autonomy under which individual choices must be abso36. This argument is developed on a more sophisticated level by Marx and Lenin
in the concept of the withering away of the state. See K. MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA
PROGRAMME (Little Marx Library, C. Dutt ed. 1938); LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION,
in THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF LENIN 272, 333-49 (Bantam ed. 1966). Of course, this

is a utopian ideal if one envisions an absolutely harmonious society in which no
coercion is required. As a direction, however, it is consistent with the theory of
autonomy and want satisfaction I have developed. Even though unable to be totally
successful, one might nevertheless attempt to alter certain aspects of the social milieu
in order to reduce competitive and aggressive values, thereby reducing the necessity
for coercion in the long run. This, of course, requires infringing upon some individially chosen lifestyles.
The alteration of the social milieu to change individual desires is a means of want
modification-itself a type of behavior modification. Behavior modification and control
through alteration of the social milieu are discussed more fully in Part III infra.
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lutely tolerated, the "humanistic" argument that connects human dignity with autonomy and the ability to define oneself as a person also
fails in that objective. The weakness in the connection between the
"humanistic" argument on the one hand and individuality and pure
tolerance on the other arises from a consideration of advances in the
understanding of behavior control. The theory of milieu therapy is
that we can affect an individual's attitudes and lifestyle by altering the
environment in which he lives. 37 If an individual's values and actions
are affected, if not determined, by the social milieu in which he lives,
and if he has an interest in autonomously choosing his own values and
action, then he has an interest in altering the social milieu in such a
way that his values and actions are formed in accordance with his
choice.
Autonomy cannot find its base in freedom from external forces in
the formation of values because too much is known about the effects
of environment and the social milieu-upon one's values to consider
this as a possibility.3 8 Rather, autonomy should refer to the ability of
an individual to control those forces that in fact do influence his
values and attitudes, i.e., to control, at least partially, the social
milieu. Since the social milieu is made up at least partially of individual instances of consensual conduct, one individual's autonomy
depends upon his ability to prescribe the conduct of other individuals
and thereby frustrate their ability to autonomously choose their own
lifestyles. Moreover, if one individual is able purposefully to structure
the social milieu in order to influence and thereby choose his own values, he will indirectly engage in a form of behavior control over
others. Having purposefully structured the social milieu in order to
structure his own values, he will have affected the values of others
through a form of milieu therapy. Thus, the interest that one individual has in autonomously choosing his own values by structuring

37.

It is not my purpose to discuss the details of various behavior control tech-

niques. I assume for the sake of discussion that the technology is at least partially successful in controlling human attitudes and behavior. For a discussion of specific
techniques, including milieu therapy, and their efficacy see P. LONDON, supra note 13;
Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616 (1972). See generally B. F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971). For a more general
discussion of behavior control techniques and their ethical implications see Sym-

posium, Viewpoints on Behavior Issues in Closed Institutions, 1TARiz. L. REV. (1975).
38.

See, e.g., B.F. SKINNER, supra note 37.
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the social milieu in which he lives will necessarily interfere with a similar interest of others. Since we share a common social milieu, and
since our ability to choose our values depends upon the structure of
that social milieu, we must choose our values and attitudes at least
partially as a community rather than as individuals. We cannot design
the social milieu to meet the requirements and desires of each individual. The act of autonomously choosing values must, therefore, be
at least a partially communal enterprise.
This argument for a communal concept of autonomy is exemplified
by a reasonable motivation for entering a monastery. An individual
might look at the world around him and determine that life in it has
instilled him with certain values-possibly values he does not desire to
hold. Such an individual might determine at time T, that he does not
wish to be a particular type of person at time T2, but he might fear
that he will become such a person at T2 if he continues to live in a
specific environment during the time interval between T, and T2.
Thus, he might enter an environment, such as a monastery, that will
facilitate his holding the values at T2 which he desires to hold. He
autonomously chooses at T1 the values he will hold, and thereby the
person he will be at T2 , rather than permit the world around him to
shape his values toward an undesired result. Although the decision to
enter a monastery commits an individual to a regimen, the individual
who makes that decision chooses his attitudes to a greater extent than
does a person who permits his attitudes to be shaped by the social environment as he finds it. 3 9 Short of entering an artificial social envi39. Thus, communal autonomy is organic rather than atomic in two respects.
Not only is autonomy sometimes exercised by a community of individuals rather
than by isolated individuals, individual self-control might refer to the ability to choose
oneself as a person over a period of time rather than at isolated moments. Autonomy might be satisfied by denying free choice in the short run in order to control
the type of person one becomes in the long run. Autonomy does not require that an
individual favor the long run over the short run, it merely permits the denial of
short-term choices for the sake of choosing oneself as a person, that is, the individual's selection of a lifeplan, over a period of time.
The distinction between long term and short term choices of oneself as a person is
not intended to coincide with the distinction between choices based upon reason
and those based upon emotion. Compare I. KANT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 17 n.2 (Library of Liberal Arts ed., L. Beck transl. 1959) and J.
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 49-99 (Penguin ed., M. Cranston transl. 1968)
with F.

DOSTOYEVSKY. NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND,

in THREE SHORT NovELs 25,

41-46 (Dell-Laurel ed., C. Garnett transl. 1960) and Blake, The Four Zoas, in
THE POEMS OF BLAKE 292 (W. H. Stevenson ed. 1971). It is true that the motivation for choosing oneself in the long term in spite of short term desires might be
based upon a preference for aesthetic values and a denigration of immediate bodily
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ronment such as a monastery to choose a social milieu and thereby a
set of values, an individual might desire to shape the larger social
of individual conmilieu by proscribing or prescribing certain courses
40
institutions.
its
form
to
aggregated
are
duct that
This form of autonomy, which must be communal, is dependent
not upon freedom from outside influences but rather upon an ability
affect an individual's attitudes
to control the outside influences which
41
and lifestyle. As B. F. Skinner puts it:
Were it not for the unwarranted generalization that all control is
wrong, we should deal with the social environment as simply as we
deal with the non-social. Although technology has freed men from certain aversive features of the environment, it has not freed them from
the environment. We accept the fact that we depend upon the world
around us, and we simply change the nature of the dependency. In the
same way, to make the social environment as free as possible of aversive stimuli we do not need to destroy that environment or escape
from it; we need to redesign it.
The greater control of the influences that define us, the greater our
autonomy.
The effect on the social milieu of institutions formed by the aggregate of individual instances of freely chosen conduct has been recog42
nized by several commentators on the social control of technology.
For example, a technological development in the field of genetics enabling parents to control physical characteristics of their children
desires. But a long-term choice might be based upon an emotional response to

competing long-term lifestyles rather than a purely rational one.
At no point have I relied upon a concept of autonomy that defines autonomous or
free behavior as that behavior which would be chosen by reason. If such a definition
of autonomy is adopted we might justify the frustration of actual choices by claiming
that other choices are more rational and therefore the ones that manifest individual
autonomy. See I. KANT, supra at 17 n.2; J. RoussEAu, supra at 46-99. For a discussion of the problems of equating autonomy or freedom with rationality see I. BERLIN,
supra note 8.

40. If an individual is unable to shape his environment, he might at least remove
the ability to act upon the desires formed by his environment during the period T1
to T 2 . For example, Odysseus "chose" himself as a person when he had himself
bound to the mast in order to avoid seduction by the Sirens. See G. Dworkin, supra
note 2, at 107.
41. B.F. SKINNER, supra note 37, at 39. See also R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND
POLITCS (1975).
42. See, e.g., Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The
Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973); Delgado &
Keyes, Parental Preferences and Selective Abortion: A Commentary on Roe v.
Wade, Doe v. Bolton and the Shape of Things to Come, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 203.
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would afford parents a greater degree of choice than they theretofore
possessed. But the exercise of this choice in individual instances
might, when aggregated, significantly affect the social milieu. Thus,
an individual with an interest in structuring the social milieu in a particular way and thereby influencing his own values and attitudes might
desire to proscribe the use of the particular genetic technology. This
desire would not be based upon a paternalistic interest in the wellbeing of the parents or their children; nor would it be based upon a
transcendental value concerning the use of genetic control. Rather, it
would be based upon an individual's desire to shape and control his
own attitudes and values by shaping and controlling the social milieu
which affects them.4 3 The force of this point is not limited to the control of new technologies. A similar, although not identical, 44 argument
can at least formally be made concerning existing social institutions
that are formed by the aggregate of individual instances of freely
chosen conduct. Thus, the notion that individuals express their dignity
by choosing themselves as persons does not necessarily support pure
tolerance of individual choices, and is perhaps more supportive of
communal autonomy.
IV.

AN ALTERNATE PERSPECTIVE ON AUTONOMY
AND TOLERANCE

The arguments presented above offer justifications for frustrating
individual free choice and are dependent upon a criterion of value
based upon human choice or upon the "humanistic" value of autonomously chosen attitudes and lifestyles. In none of the arguments was it
necessary to refer to a transcendental "morality" or a paternalistic desire to frustrate another individual's free choice for his own good. In
each example it became necessary for the community to collectively

43. The ability of parents to select the sex of their children is an example of
genetic control that is more fully treated in Delgado & Keyes, supra note 42.
44. The analysis of choices presented by a new technology or social institution
is not precisely identical to the analysis of choices presented by an existing technology or social institution. Unlike the alteration of the status quo, the proscription
of new technologies or institutions does not frustrate immediate desires that have
been firmly instilled over a long period of time. Nevertheless, the analysis of choices
offered by new technology demonstrates the inadequacy of instrumental reasoning
for the task of determining the constellation of choices we desire to be offered. See
Tribe, supra note 42.
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determine a "good" lifestyle or attitude and impose it upon unwilling
individuals in order to satisfy the value of communal autonomy. The
arguments cast doubt upon the liberal conception of autonomy and its
connection with individuality and pure tolerance. The distinction between a purely individualistic idea of autonomy with its relationship
to pure tolerance and a more communal conception of autonomy can
be clarified by a comparison of metaphors.
We might imagine Mill's concept of liberty as a situation in which
individuals are analogized to billiard balls. 4 5 If the billiard balls are
free to move through space, their freedom might be viewed as the absence of interference from other billiard balls. As long as one billiard
ball does not collide with other billiard balls it is not affecting the
freedom of those other billiard balls. Its own movement must therefore be tolerated under Mill's principle of liberty.
The analogy between human activity and the ability of a billiard
ball to move freely through space without interfering collisions is dubious. Very little important human activity is comprised of totally individual conduct. Individuals define themselves not so much by physical location and movement free from external constraint as they do
by the roles they play in society. 46 For example, a person might define
himself as a teacher, spouse, parent, and friend. None of these roles is
possible, however, without the human institutions of teaching, marriage, parenthood, and friendship. An individual is not free to be a
teacher unless the role of teacher exists in the society in which he
lives.4 7 The existence of the role of teacher requires a specific constellation of activities of other individuals in the society; it requires more
than that an individual be left alone in the sense that a billiard ball
does not suffer collisions by other billiard balls.
If human activity is predominantly characterized by social roles,
freedom is best viewed as the range of possibilities in terms of roles
and lifestyles that are available for an individual to assume. Rather
45.

The metaphor was inspired by a similar one, using expanding balloons, used

by Robert Wolff in Beyond Tolerance, in R. WOLFF, B. MOORE & H. MARCUSE,
supra note 35, at 23-33.
46. See R. UNGER, supra note 41; R. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 69-78

(1970).
47. Of course, the first teacher "invented" the role, and the role of teacher evolves
as individuals alter its contours. Nevertheless, a person could not be a teacher in an
institutional setting as we know it today unless the institutional role of teacher has
been fairly well established.
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than billiard balls moving through space affected only by direct collision between themselves and other billiard balls, human activity might
better be analogized to billiard balls moving through force fields,
paths, or channels that are formed by the constellation of other billiard balls in the environment. This metaphor undermines the force of
Mill's principle of pure tolerance; individuals must do more than
avoid my path in order to preserve my freedom, they must align themselves and their activities in certain general ways in order for me to be
free to choose the particular lifestyle I desire. Within this metaphor,
freedom is a concept concerned with an individual's freedom to act
rather than freedom from interference. 48 The social milieu, and within
it, the constellation of social roles and institutions, is a product of individual instances of conduct. Rather than each individual autonomously choosing himself as a person, the community of individuals,
by defining the constellation of social institutions and roles that make
up the social milieu, collectively defines itself as a community of per49
sons.
48. See I. BERLIN, supra note 8; Fuller, Freedom: A Suggested Analysis, 68
HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1955). W.B. Yeats suggested a more expressive metaphor when
he asked:
0 chestnut tree, greatrooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?
A body swayed to music. 0 brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?
W. B. Yeats, Among School Children, in COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 249,

251 (MacMillan Co. ed. 1933). See also Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL.
REV. 3 (1955).

The dancer is free to define himself only in relation to the dance. First, the meaning
of being a dancer is dependent upon the contours of the dance. This in turn is
dependent upon the constellation of activities of other dancers who participate. Each
dancer both affects the dance for the other dancers and is affected by the conduct
of the other dancers that define the dance. Moreover, the attitudes and desires of a
dancer might themselves be affected by the nature of the dance in which he participates.
If we cannot separate the dancer from the dance which defines him, we cannot
reasonably determine whether the dancer is free from the constraints of the dance
and the other dancers. Each dancer affects the dance for others and is affected by
the dance as defined by others. The concept of each individual dancer autonomously
defining himself gives way to a conception of the community of dancers collectively
defining the dance.
Yeats' image has deeper impact in addition to its use here: it questions the distinction between person and his work. A total criticism of liberal thought must
question this and other dualisms (e.g., rule/value and reason/desire) that serve as the
underpinnings of liberal thought. By questioning one, Yeats opens the door for
criticizing the others. See R. UNGER, supra note 41.
49. It is true that communal autonomy is inconsistent with a conception of value
based solely upon individual choice. It is not, however, inconsistent with a conception
of value that is based solely upon human choice. Thus, we need not disagree with
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V.

ALTERNATIVE OBJECTIONS TO FRUSTRATING
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE

Thus far, I have argued that autonomy has communal aspects and
is not antithetical to the imposition of communally determined lifestyles and attitudes upon unwilling individuals. We are not, however,
left without bases for objecting to impositions of communally determined lifestyles and attitudes upon unwilling individuals in specific
circumstances. Communal autonomy permits, but does not require,
departures from individualism. It remains possible to criticize specific
impositions of communal norms, such as criminal laws that enforce
sexual norms and objectionable uses of behavior control, by referring
to values other than autonomy or by referring to communal autonomy
itself.
First, the enforcement of communally determined sexual norms
entails undesirable invasions of individual privacy. 50 The ability of a
community to structure its social milieu and individual privacy are
competing values that must be balanced. A great deal of privacy
should be afforded individuals for its own sake5 ' even while recognizing its cost of frustrating the community's ability to structure its
social milieu.
Second, communal norms that attempt to control the details of an
individual's life require careful structuring of the lifeplan by the indiZarathustra when he says: "Verily, men gave themselves all their good and evil.
Verily, they did not take it, did not find it, nor did it come to them as a voice from
F. NIETZSCHE,
heaven. Only man placed values in things to preserve himself.
supra note 10, at 171.
A final salutary effect of a communal concept of autonomy should be noted. It is
true that we are chilled by the suppression of individuality in 1984, but we might just

as easily respond to the lonely image of a solitary wanderer on a cold, snow-swept
plain in juxtaposition to a village with lighted windows. See R. Wolff, Beyond Tolerance, in R. WOLFF, B. MOORE & H. MARCUSE, supra note 35, at 31-32. We ought
not react to excessive communalization with a desire for pure individualism. Like
Attic Tragedy, we should seek a society that synthesizes our Apollonian individualism
with our Dionysian desire to dissolve individuality and participate in community.
See F. NIETZSCHE, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, in THE BIRTH OF
TRAGEDY & THE GENEAOLOGY OF MORALS 19 (Anchor Books ed., F. Golffing transl.
1956). A communal conception of value can also help alleviate the anxiety caused
by the infinite regress inherent in pure instrumentalism. See A. C. MacIntyre, Against
Utilitarianism,in AIMS INEDUCATION I (T. Hollins ed. 1964).
50. See F. SCHUR & H. BEDEAU, supra note 2, at 11-18; Comment, supra note 4,
at 602-03; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51. See C. FRIED, supra note 14, at 137; Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE LJ. 475 (1968).
In addition, individual privacy is an especially powerful argument against communally determined attitudes instilled by institutionalized methods of behavior control.
See note 17 supra.
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vidual to comply with the norm. This restricts an individual's ability to
escape rational calculation for the sake of whimsical and spontaneous
52
behavior and thereby ignores the warning of the Underground Man:
[M]an everywhere and at all times, whoever he may be, has preferred to act as he chose and not in the least as his reason and advantage dictated. And one may choose what is contrary to one's own interests, and sometimes one positively ought (that is my idea). One's
own free unfettered choice, one's own caprice-however wild it may
be, one's own fancy worked up at times to frenzy-is that very 'most
advantageous advantage' which we have overlooked, which comes
under no classification and against which all systems and theories are
continually being shattered to atoms. And how do these wiseacres
know that man wants a normal, a virtuous choice? What has made
them conceive that man must want a rationally advantageous choice?
What man wants is simply independent choice, whatever that independence may cost and wherever it may lead. And choice, of course,
the devil only knows what choice ...
Indeed, life would be abhorrent if every aspect of it were planned by
the community with nothing left to the whim of the individual.
Thus, the social milieu and its institutions should be designed to
leave much room for non-calculated, spontaneous, individual activity. 53 This is, however, an argument concerning the substantive design
of the social milieu rather than the community's need to control it.
Communal attempts to control too many details of an individual's life,
either through the enforcement of social norms or through intensive
institutional behavior control programs, 54 should be resisted for the
reasons mentioned by the Underground Man. Still, much can be done
to influence the social milieu without reaching an undesirable level
of detailed control. Indeed, a laissez-faire development of social institutions might itself create a social milieu that suppresses spontaneity.
A third basis from which specific communal norms or behavior control programs can be criticized is the extent to which they cause individual suffering, whether physical or psychological. Although a
communal conception of autonomy implies that short-term individual
choices need not be absolutely protected for the sake of autonomy itself, we need not and ought not be oblivious to the suffering caused
52.

F. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 39, at 45-46.

53.
54.

See note 17 supra.
Id.
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by the frustration of immediate individual desires. Thus, social norms
that proscribe homosexuality can be criticized, not because they offend autonomy, but rather because they frustrate pervasive and intense desires held by some individuals. 5 5 Communal autonomy only
removes individualistic autonomy's absolute proscription against controlling our social institutions in order to control our destiny when
those social institutions are the result of individual instances of consensual behavior. It is true that every frustration of an immediate
individual desire causes a certain amount of suffering, but the community's desire to shape its social milieu need not and should not be
given absolute priority. It must compete with, and often defer to, the
value of avoiding human suffering. Similarly, just as the norm itself
should not cause an intolerable level of suffering, neither should the
56
community impose unduly harsh sanctions for its breach.
The fourth basis. for objecting to radical forms of behavior control
-as opposed to a gradual alteration of values caused by reshaping
the social milieu-draws upon the concept of a person as an entity
that continues over time. 57 An individual should be able to identify
with the type of person he was in the past and will be in the future. Of
course, an individual changes as a person over time, but if the change
is gradual he is likely to make adjustments and relate to himself at different periods of his life. On the other hand, a sharp break in personality such as that which would be created by psychosurgery or a rigorous program of milieu therapy might create a temporal discontin58
uity in an individual that would have undesirable consequences.
Broad forms of behavior control that rely upon reshaping major social
institutions work more gradually and do not entail the adverse consequences of inserting a temporal discontinuity in an individual's life.
A fifth and very fruitful basis for criticizing specific impositions of
communal lifestyles and attitudes upon unwilling individuals depends
upon the content of those lifestyles and attitudes. For example, we
55. Similarly, closely supervised institutional behavior control programs and shock
therapy might cause an intolerable level of suffering for those who are controlled. Id.
56.

Thus, a conclusion that bigamy should be proscribed does not imply that

bigamists should be killed or indeed, even punished. This point is not limited to the
control of self-regarding conduct. For example, the community has the undoubted
right to enforce traffic laws, but we do not feel required to imprison violators.
57.

See note 14 supra. See also R. UNGER, supra note 41.

58. See G. Dworkin, Autonomy and Behavior Control, 1975 (unpublished manuscript on file at the offices of the Washington Law Review); see generally Symposium,
supra note 37.
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might criticize criminal laws that suppress human sexuality not for the
sake of preserving autonomy but rather as a critique of anti-sexual
values. Similarly, we might object to institutional uses of behavior
control that attempt to instill middle-class values on dissident members of the population by criticizing middle-class values or by asserting the value of dissidence. On the other hand, we might rely on
the negative value of violence to justify its elimination on television as
a purposeful attempt to reduce aggressive and violent attitudes. Autonomy does not distinguish between tolerating sexuality and tolerating violence, but the relative value of sexuality and violence does
make such a distinction.
The objection might be raised that it is hypocritical or inconsistent
to tolerate the sexual practices of some individuals while being intolerant of the desire of other individuals to watch violence on television
or participate in consensual exploitive social institutions. As Gerald
Dworkin has pointed out, however, the critique based upon inconsistency or hypocrisy is invalid. 59 Tolerance of some forms of conduct
but not of others does not apply a principle to one situation while refusing to apply it to another. Rather, a principle applied to the two
situations takes notice of the relative value of the two forms of conduct. The principle is, therefore, substantive and fuzzy rather than formal and clear. But a refusal to apply formal rules is not an example of
inconsistency or hypocrisy: one principle is applied consistently to both
situations.
A related objection to the imposition of communal lifestyles and
attitudes expresses a concern over the person or institution that will
decide the relative value of competing lifestyles and attitudes. The
spectre of a social planner with a perverse sense of value is not an attractive one. 60 A laissez-faire development of social institutions mitigates the fear that the power to structure the social milieu will fall into
the hands of an "evil" person.
A preliminary response to this objection is that nothing in the concept of communal autonomy requires us to abandon democratic decision-making processes in favor of a singular social planner. But even
if communal determinations of "good" attitudes and lifestyles are
made by democratic institutions, there is a danger that those institu59.
60.

G. Dworkin, Non-neutralPrinciples,71 J. PHIL. 491 (1974).
See R.M. HARE, supra note 4.
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tions will be abused or that the majority itself will take a disastrous
adventure in social planning. A formal rule such as pure tolerance
might be argued to be a necessary hedge against these dangers. Such a
justification would recognize that pure tolerance and the laissez-faire
development of consensual social institutions does not result in the
most desirable social milieu, but it has the advantage of guarding
against disaster. Like all formalities, this justification recognizes that
we must break some eggs to make an omelet, that we must sacrifice
the ability to arrive at the best possible result in order to guard against
abuse.6 1 The objections raised above do not, however, find their basis
in autonomy.
I shall not argue at length that pure tolerance is not justified as a
formal barrier to protect society from social error. 62 But it is one thing
to justify pure tolerance as an instrumental means for another end or
as a formal protection against another evil. It is quite another thing to
perceive pure tolerance as an end in itself and as an absolute right
inhering in individuals. We might recognize the value of pure tolerance as a formality, but we cannot close our eyes to the costs of formalism. We should adopt pure tolerance as a formality only if its benefits in terms of preventing abuse outweigh its cost in terms of perpetuating exploitive or otherwise undesirable consensual social institutions. Moreover, even if pure tolerance as a formality can be justified
as a general proposition, specific situations might arise where the
value of structuring the social milieu outweighs the detriment of par63
tially undermining the formality.
61.

See Kennedy, Legal*Formalism, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 351 (1973). Rawls'

development of the original position, the veil of ignorance and the theory of the
maximin reflects a hedge against disaster at the cost of foregoing the possibility of

the most desirable result. See J. RiwLs, supra note 14, passim (1971). Kant's categorical imperative permits a discriminating concept of tolerance that distinguishes

between "good" conduct and "bad" conduct through properly structuring the univer-

sal maxim. But since the "maxim giver" in Rawls' original position is unaware of his
social role, he will not risk a maxim that is intolerant of the type of conduct inherent
in a specific social role. See J. RAWLS, supra at 251-57. Unless we desire to adopt a
theory of pure tolerance as a formal hedge against abuse, communal autonomy
supports Kantian flexibility rather than the emasculation of substantive judgments
implied by Rawls' veil of ignorance.

.62. For a suggestion that pure tolerance is not justified as a formality compare
Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in R. WOLFF, B. MOORE & H. MtAcusE, supra note
35, at 81; Marcuse, Sartre's Existentialism, in STUDImS IN CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 157
(1972), and Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. Rav. 630 (1958) with H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1958).

63. This point is developed more fully in discussions of act utilitarianism versus
rule utilitarianism. See, e.g., Smart, Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism,6 PHIL.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 51: 33, 1975

A final basis from which to criticize specific institutional uses of
behavior control arises from a consideration of communal autonomy
itself. Communal autonomy partially substitutes communal self-control for individual self-control. But it does not abandon the concept of
self-control by permitting one community of individuals to control the
lifestyle and attitudes of another community of individuals. Thus,
communal autonomy permits individuals to structure their social environment and thereby choose themselves as persons. But it does not
permit a group of individuals to structure a social milieu in which they
do not live but in which they force other people to live. Communal
autonomy remains connected with self-control in that individuals must
participate in the decision-making process which determines the contours of the social milieu in which they live. 64 Conversely, those indi-

viduals who infringe upon the free choice of other individuals for the
sake of structuring the social milieu and thereby choosing themselves
as persons can justify their action under the concept of communal
autonomy only if they are affected by the rules which they have
adopted, that is, only if they live within the social milieu which they
65
have designed.
VI.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that autonomy should not be tied to individualism
and that it requires at least a partially communal determination of
ourselves as persons and of the lives we want to live. Thus, as Marcuse suggests, 6 6 we need not tolerate, for the sake of autonomy, every
form of behavior regardless of its repressive, violent, or exploitative
nature. On the other hand, persuasive substantive arguments can be
developed to criticize repressive uses of behavior control and the enforcement of specific social norms. In opposing those uses of behavior

Q. 344 (1956); McCloskey, An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism, 66 PHIL.
REV. 466 (1957); Wasserstrom, The Obligation to Obey the Law, 10 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 780 (1963). See generally Kennedy, supra note 61, at 371.
64. See I. BERLIN, supra note 8, at 39-52.
65. Thus, institutional behavior control programs violate even a communal conception of autonomy. The prisoners have not infringed upon individual free choice
in order to structure their own social milieu, but rather have had a social milieu
imposed upon them by people unwilling to live within it.
66. Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in R. WOLFF, B. MOORE & H. MARCUSE, supra
note 35, at 81.
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control and the enforcement of specific social norms we need not,
however, rely upon a theory of pure tolerance that emasculates our
ability to control our social institutions and thereby our lives. Autonomy cannot be used to support a theory of pure tolerance that prevents us from examining our social institutions and redesigning them
to be more compatable with a humane conception of life.

